Previous evidence suggests that distinct fronto-parietal regions may be involved in representing action kinematics (means) and action results (outcome) during action observation. However, the evidence is contradictory with respect to the precise regions that are critical for each type of representation. Additionally unknown is the degree to which ability to detect action means and outcome during observation is related to action production performance. We used a behavioral task to evaluate the ability of healthy and left-hemisphere stroke participants to detect differences between pairs of videos that dissociated object-related action means (e.g., wiping with circular or straight movement) and/or outcome (e.g., applying or removing detergent). We expected that deficits in detecting action means would be associated with spatiomotor gesture production deficits, whereas deficits in detecting action outcome would predict impairments in complex naturalistic action. We also hypothesized a posterior to anterior gradient in the regions critical for each type of representation, disproportionately affecting means and outcome encoding, respectively. Results indicated that outcome -but not means -detection predicted naturalistic action performance in stroke participants. Regression and voxel lesion-symptom mapping analyses of lesion data revealed that means -but not outcome -coding relies on the integrity of the left inferior parietal lobe, whereas no selective critical brain region could be identified for outcome detection. Thus, means and outcome representations are dissociable at both the behavioral and neuroanatomical levels. Furthermore, the data are consistent with a degree of parallelism between action perception and production tasks. Finally, they reinforce the evidence for a critical role of the left inferior parietal lobule in the representation of action means, whereas action outcome may rely on a more distributed neural circuit.
Introduction
Understanding how individuals achieve complex, multi-step actions in everyday life settings is one of the main challenges of action and cognition research. Towards this aim, a number of influential models have proposed that complex actions have their basis in a hierarchical goal structure (Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; Bernstein, 1996; Cooper & Shallice, 2000 , 2006 Farag et al., 2010; Norman & Shallice, 1986; Schneider & Logan, 2007; Shallice & Burgess, 1996; Stanton, 2006) . In such frameworks, planning complex actions requires the maintenance of temporally distant goals in accordance with a desired outcome (e.g. making a cup of coffee) while planning and executing a series of action subgoals (e.g. grasping the cup, pouring coffee, adding cream, etc.). In many such models, planning and control are achieved via actions at distinct levels of representation, including a kinematic level (e.g., close the fingers in a specified configuration), an object-goal level (e. g., grasp a cup) and an outcome level (e.g., drink the coffee) (Hamilton & Grafton, 2008) .
A number of lines of evidence indicate that kinematic representations of action 'means' may be behaviorally distinguished from action outcomes. For example, human participants (unlike chimpanzees) are able to efficiently represent both kinematics and outcomes when the two appear to be inconsistent (Kaneko & Tomonaga, 2012) . Moreover, motor priming from action observation has been reported as a result of either action means or outcome congruency between observed and executed actions, depending on the characteristics of the task (Ocampo, Painter, & Kritikos, 2012) . Execution of the action of drinking from a cup can be facilitated by perceiving an action such as drinking from a cup using a power grip (same outcome) or making a toast with a cup 
